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Abstract
Analytical and numerical results show how the presence of a sub-
sidy on household and ﬁrm purchases of oil products distorts long-
run macroeconomic aggregates in an oil-importing developing country.
Beyond leading to over-consumption of oil products these subsidies
also lead to increased labor supply, a distorted emphasis on producing
traded goods, and higher real wages. The subsidy also impacts the rel-
ative price of non-traded goods, causing it to fall when the non-traded
sector is more oil-intensive than the traded sector and vice-versa.
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1 Introduction
Subsidies on petroleum products such as diesel and kerosene have been an
important issue for many developing countries.1 One reason is the sheer cost
of providing them. For example, one IMF staﬀ report shows that depending
upon the year considered, the annual cost of fuel subsidies in Egypt in the
latter half of the 2000s ranged from almost four to seven percent of GDP.
Another IMF staﬀ report shows that transfers to the state owned petroleum
company in Bangladesh were a little less than one and a half percent of GDP
in ﬁscal year 2008. Said and Leigh (2006) show that for a sample of countries
in 2005 the average cost of explicit expenditures on fuel subsidies was almost
two and a half percent of GDP. These subsidies, therefore, represent a fairly
large expenditure for the governments that have them in place.
Another reason fuel subsidies have been an important policy issue has
been the diﬃculty in reducing or removing them, often due to the politi-
cal turmoil their removal causes. Evidence presented in both Baig, Mati,
Coady, and Ntamatungiro (2007) and Coady, Gillingham, Ossowski, Pi-
otrowski, Tareq, and Tyson (2010) suggest this hesitancy appears to have
been true even given the large increase in the world price of oil seen in the
last half decade. Examples where the pass-through of an increase in world
oil prices to domestic prices is less than ﬁfty percent do not appear to be
uncommon.
Given their cost and persistence, it is likely that these subsidies have
important macroeconomic implications for the countries that choose to enact
them. This paper asks the question of how these fuel subsidies aﬀect the
macroeconomy of a small, oil-importing developing country in the long-run.
The answer to this question, and the main contribution of this paper to the
literature, comes in the form of analytical and numerical results that show
how these subsidies distort the steady state of a small open economy model
that incorporates currency substitution, household and ﬁrm demand for oil
products, and a subsidy provided by the government on the purchase of those
oil products. For a simple model that abstracts from non-traded goods, I
present a number of easily interpretable analytical results that provide clear
answers about the direction in which a given variable changes when fuel
1The introduction draws heavily upon a number of IMF working papers and other
sources, including but not limited to Bacon and Kojima (2006), Baig, Mati, Coady, and
Ntamatungiro (2007), and Coady, Gillingham, Ossowski, Piotrowski, Tareq, and Tyson
(2010). More sources are listed in the bibliography.
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subsidies are increased or decreased. In cases where the sign of the change
is indeterminate the analytical solutions often show which parameters drive
the results. These results then help provide useful intuition for the numerical
results produced for a more complicated model that incorporates non-traded
goods.
A priori, fuel subsidies would appear to simply promote over-consumption
of fuel products. The main point of this paper, however, is that these subsi-
dies have other important eﬀects driven by general equilibrium interactions
and the fact that they require government ﬁnancing. The results show that
fuel subsidies drive up hours worked and real wages, lead to an over-emphasis
on producing traded goods, and distort the relative price of non-traded goods.
In addition, the increased taxation that is necessary to fund the subsidy can
lead to a 'crowding out' of non-oil consumption under certain conditions.
These are important byproducts typically not discussed by policy makers
when considering the pros and cons of fuel subsidies.
There is a large literature that focuses on oil and the macroeconomy. This
paper joins the subset of that literature that deals speciﬁcally with fuel subsi-
dies. Bouakez, Rebei, and Vencatachellum (2008) use a small open economy
DSGE model that features nominal rigidities to explore the optimality, in a
welfare maximizing sense, of limiting the pass-through of a shock to world
oil prices to domestic oil prices. Both Coady, El-Said, Gillingham, Kpo-
dar, Medas, and Newhouse (2006) and del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham
(2010) use models based on input-output tables to calculate the real income
losses associated with reducing subsidies on fuel products.
Whereas Bouakez, Rebei, and Vencatachellum (2008) focus on optimal
monetary policy in the short-run, this work focuses speciﬁcally on the long-
run impacts that fuel subsidies have on macroeconomic aggregates. As op-
posed to Coady, El-Said, Gillingham, Kpodar, Medas, and Newhouse (2006)
and del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2010), the models used in this
work are relatively simple, fully speciﬁed general equilibrium models. The
general equilibrium approach means that the results capture a richer set of in-
teractions between household behavior, ﬁrm behavior, and ﬁscal policy. The
simplicity of the models allows the derivation of many analytical results that,
in general, would be diﬃcult or impossible to derive in larger scale models.
These results enhance our understanding of how subsidies aﬀect the macroe-
conomy and provide useful intuition for the results from more complicated
models.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, I intro-
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duce a simple open economy model that produces traded goods and use this
model to derive analytical results about the long-run implications of subsi-
dies on fuel products. The third section adds non-traded goods to the model.
The fourth section summarizes and concludes.
2 A Primitive Model
To begin, I consider a small open economy that produces only a composite
traded good. Some of the production of this traded good is consumed by
households while the rest is used to purchase oil from world oil markets. The
economy is small in that it has no eﬀect on the world price of the traded
good or the world price of oil.
At this point, I abstract from non-traded goods. Doing so allows me to
derive relatively clean analytical results which provide useful intuition for the
numerical results presented later for a more complicated model that contains
non-traded goods.
The notation used in the exposition is as follows. dX is the diﬀerential
of the variable X, X˙ is the time derivative of X, X¯ is the steady state value
of X, and Xˆ is the log-diﬀerential of X, i.e. Xˆ = dX/X.
2.1 Households
Household activity is controlled by a representative agent who derives disutil-
ity from working and utility from consumption of a traded good, consumption
of fuel products, and from holdings of real money balances.
The agent's problem is to maximize
∫ ∞
0

(
CT
σc−1
σc + a1O
h
σc−1
σc
)( σcσc−1 )(1− 1τ )
1− 1τ
− κ1L
1+ 1µ
1 + 1µ
+ κ2
(
m
σm−1
σm + b1F
σm−1
σm
)( σmσm−1 )(1− 1τ )
(PCPI)
1− 1τ (1− 1τ )
 e
−ρsds,
(1)
subject to a real wealth constraint,
A = m+ b+ F, (2)
and the ﬂow constraint
A˙ = W TLT + (i− χ)b− CT − P sOh − T − χm. (3)
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CT is consumption of the traded good. PPP holds so the domestic price
of CT , denoted as P˜ , is given by
P˜ = eP T ,
where e is the nominal exchange rate and P T is the world price of the traded
good in dollars. The nominal exchange rate measures the number of units of
domestic currency per one dollar and the rate of depreciation is given by
χ =
e˙
e
.
Core inﬂation, i.e. the inﬂation rate of P˜ , is denoted as pi and is equal to
pi = χ+ piT .
Since the economy in question does not aﬀect the world price of the traded
good, it is convenient to assume that P T is constant and equal to one which
implies that piT is equal to 0 at all times. I assume for the rest of the paper
that the traded good is the numeraire and deﬂate all nominal variables by e.
The agent also derives utility from the use of fuel products, Oh. The price
of these products on world markets is given by P o. Households do not pay
the world price, however, but instead face a subsidized price, P s. As with
traded goods, the economy is small and does not aﬀect the world price of oil.
The variable m is real money balances of the domestic currency and F
the stock of foreign currency. The term PCPI is the theoretic consumer price
index (CPI) deﬂated by the nominal exchange rate. The exact equation for
PCPI is determined by the assumptions made on the utility function and, in
this case, is given by
PCPI =
(
1 + aσc1 P
s1−σc
) 1
1−σc . (4)
Besides the two currencies, the agent also has access to a domestically traded
nominal bond. This asset pays a nominal interest rate of i, and its real value
is given by b. In equilibrium the bond is in net-zero supply.
The parameters τ and µ are the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the wage elasticity of labor supply, respectively. The elasticity of substi-
tution between consumption of traded goods and oil products is σc, and the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currency is σm.
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Income from labor is given by W TLT , where W T is the real wage in the
traded sector and LT = L is labor supplied to the traded sector. The agent
also pays taxes in two forms. The total value of lump sum taxes are denoted
by T . Income lost due to the inﬂation tax is given by the term χm.
Deﬁne λ1 as the multiplier on the ﬂow constraint. The ﬁrst order condi-
tions for the agent's problem are
(
CT
σc−1
σc + a1O
h
σc−1
σc
)( σcσc−1)(1− 1τ )−1
CT
− 1
σc = λ1, (5)(
CT
σc−1
σc + a1O
h
σc−1
σc
)( σcσc−1)(1− 1τ )−1
a1O
h− 1σc = P sλ1 (6)
κ1L
1
µ = W Tλ1, (7)
κ2b1F
− 1
σm
(
m
σm−1
σm + b1F
σm−1
σm
)( σmσm−1)(1− 1τ )−1
λ1 (PCPI)
1− 1
τ
= (i− χ), (8)
κ2m
− 1
σm
(
m
σm−1
σm + b1F
σm−1
σm
)( σmσm−1)(1− 1τ )−1
λ1 (PCPI)
1− 1
τ
= i, (9)
ρ+ χ− i = λ˙1
λ1
. (10)
Equations (5) and (6) set the marginal cost of the two consumption goods
equal to their marginal utilities. Equation (7) sets the marginal beneﬁt of
working more equal to the marginal dis-utility of doing so. Equation (9)
sets the beneﬁt of holding an extra unit of domestic currency equal to the
opportunity cost of doing so, which is the nominal interest rate i. Equation
(8) does likewise for the domestic bond, with the beneﬁt being equal to i−χ
and the opportunity cost equal to the foregone utility that would have been
derived by holding more of the foreign currency.
2.2 Production
Production of the traded good is done by a representative ﬁrm operating
under perfect competition using the CES technology
QT =
[(
ATLT
)σT−1
σT + c1
(
OT
)σT−1
σT
] σT
σT−1
, (11)
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where AT is a scaling factor, c1 a distribution parameter, O
T is oil demanded
by the ﬁrm, and σT is the elasticity of substitution between labor and oil
demanded.
Assuming the ﬁrm pays the subsidized price for oil, the ﬁrst order condi-
tions for the ﬁrm's proﬁt maximization problem are
QT
1
σT
(
ATLT
)− 1
σT AT = W T , (12)
QT
1
σT c1
(
OT
)− 1
σT = P s. (13)
These set the marginal products of the inputs equal to their marginal costs.
Note that if P s < P o, it is in the ﬁrms interest to overuse oil products and,
because of the complementarity between oil and labor, to also overuse labor.
2.3 The Government
The government provides a subsidy on fuel products and earns revenue from
levying lump sum taxes and from the inﬂation tax. I assume that the govern-
ment purchases oil at the world price of P o and then sells it at the subsidized
price P s, with P s ≤ P o.
In the developing world, it is often the case that fuel subsidies fall most
heavily on kerosene and diesel. The former is typically used as a heating
oil while the latter is used in transportation and electricity generation. This
suggests that a good starting point would be to assume that both households
and ﬁrms beneﬁt from the subsidies. In this case, the government budget
constraint is
m˙ = (P o − P s)
(
Oh +OT
)
− T − χm. (14)
In the steady state this equation reads
T¯ + χ¯m¯ =
(
P¯ o − P¯ s
) (
O¯h + O¯T
)
,
where the left hand side is the total revenue available to the government,
while the right hand side is the total expenditures made by the govern-
ment. This equation makes clear that lowering P s requires the government
to increase revenues by either increasing lump sum taxes (raising T¯ ), or by
increasing seigniorage revenue through an increase in the steady state rate
of inﬂation (raising χ¯).2
2In the steady state the domestic inﬂation rate of the traded good, pi, is exactly equal
to χ so raising χ is analogous to raising pi.
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2.4 Government Taxation and Household Decisions
The government's revenue comes from lump sum taxation, T , and from
seigniorage revenue, χm. Any increase in spending on subsidies must be
ﬁnanced by increasing the revenue derived from one or both of those sources.
Increased taxes can change household behavior by reducing the disposable
income available to households and, potentially, by distorting the ﬁrst-order
conditions that hold when they make their optimal decisions.
Lump sum taxation, by its very nature, does not distort the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the agent. It does, however, reduce the agent's disposable
income and hence produce income eﬀects. This can be seen by evaluating
the agent's budget constraint, equation (3), at a steady state, which produces
C¯T + P¯ sO¯h = W¯ T L¯T − T¯ − χ¯m¯.
Holding all else constant a rise in T reduces the income available to be spent
on consumption goods. This causes changes in how much the agent consumes
and, through variations in the marginal utility of consumption, the agent's
decision about how much to work.
Financing the subsidy through increased seigniorage also reduces the in-
come available to households. In addition to that, it distorts the agent's
holdings of m and F by increasing the opportunity cost of holding domestic
currency. To see this, note that equation (10) evaluated at a steady state
reads
i¯ = ρ+ χ¯.
Using the inﬂation tax means raising χ¯, which drives up the steady state
nominal interest rate. As shown in equation (9), the agent's ﬁrst order con-
dition for m, the nominal interest rate is the opportunity cost of holding
domestic currency so when it goes up the agent will choose to re-allocate his
holdings of m and F .
2.5 The Current Account
The equation linking the current account to the accumulation of foreign
currency can be derived by combining the agent's ﬂow constraint with the
government budget constraint and then substituting out W tLT using the
zero-proﬁt condition of the ﬁrm. Doing so gives
F˙ = QT − CT − P o(Oh +OT ). (15)
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This states that the economy accumulates foreign assets whenever the econ-
omy produces more of the traded good than it consumes of the traded good
and oil products. Evaluating equation (15) at the steady state gives
Q¯T = C¯T + P¯ o
(
O¯h + O¯T
)
.
In the long-run, trade must balance so any spending on the traded consump-
tion good and oil products, which are also traded commodities, must be met
by increased production of the traded good.
2.6 Steady State Implications of the Subsidy
It is possible to derive some useful analytical results for how small changes
in P s change the economy's steady state. Equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (11),
(12), (13), and (15) provide the solutions for PCPI , CT , Oh, L, QT , W , OT ,
and λ1. These variables can be solved separately from the other ones due to
the separability of money in the utility function and the fact that taxation in
this model is non-distortionary with respect to the non-monetary variables.
With these solutions, it is then possible to solve for how m, F , i, and T or χ
vary when P s changes. This can be done using equations (8), (9), (10), and
(14).
The solutions are a combination of the eﬀects brought about because
the agent faces a diﬀerent relative price for Oh and because the ﬁrm faces
a diﬀerent relative cost for OT . It pays dividends, though, to consider how
each of these channels aﬀects the solutions in isolation from the other. To
do this, I ﬁrst solve for a case where the household pays the subsidized price
but the ﬁrm pays the world price of oil. I then consider what happens if the
household pays the world price of oil but the ﬁrm pays the subsidized price.
2.6.1 Subsidy Beneﬁts Only Households
Begin by diﬀerentiating the two ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrm, which
always pays P o for oil products in this case. Since the economy is small and
does not aﬀect world oil prices, one immediately ﬁnds that
Wˆ T = 0. (16)
Since there is no change in the marginal product of oil the real wage remains
constant. It is also easy to show that in this case
OˆT = LˆT ,
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a result driven by the fact that the relative price of oil to labor remains
unchanged in this case.
The solutions for CT , Oh, λ1, and L
T must be derived jointly. The current
account equation gives
LˆT =
θct
1− θot Cˆ
T +
θoh
1− θot Oˆ
h,
where
θct =
C¯T
Q¯T
,
θot =
P¯ oO¯T
Q¯T
,
θoh =
P¯ oO¯h
Q¯T
.
A solution for λ1 in terms of O
h and CT can be produced using the house-
hold's ﬁrst order condition for LT and the equation just derived from the
current account. The ﬁrst order conditions for CT and Oh can then be used
to show that their solutions are
Oˆh = − σc1
τ
+ 1
µ
[
τγoh + σcγct
σcτ
+
θct
µ(1− θot)
]
Pˆ s, (17)
CˆT = − σc1
τ
+ 1
µ
[
(τ − σc)γoh
σcτ
− θoh
µ(1− θot)
]
Pˆ s, (18)
where
γct =
C¯T
C¯T + P¯ sO¯h
,
γoh =
P¯ sO¯h
C¯T + P¯ sO¯h
,
are the expenditure shares for the two consumption goods in the original
steady state.
As one would expect, for Oh the coeﬃcient in front of Pˆ s is negative so
that lowering P s leads to increased consumption of fuel products. The solu-
tion for CT , however, is more complicated as the coeﬃcient can be positive or
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negative depending upon the calibration of the model. As shown in the tech-
nical appendix, CT and Oh are Edgeworth substitutes, independent goods, or
Edgeworth complements as τ <=> σc. When τ ≤ σc, i.e. the two goods are
substitutes or independent, lowering P s unambiguously lowers consumption
of the traded good. On the other hand, when τ > σc consumption rises iﬀ
µ >
θohσcτ
(1− θot)γoh(τ − σc) .
At ﬁrst glance, this result may seem odd since the two goods are com-
plements when τ > σc. A partial equilibrium approach would say that in
this case CT should rise since P s has been lowered. But, this is a general
equilibrium model and the solution for CT captures both substitution eﬀects
driven by the change in P s and income eﬀects driven by increased taxation.
Increased subsidies (lower P s) require increased taxation which, in the end,
the agent pays for by reducing consumption and working more. When the
labor supply is very inelastic, i.e. µ is very small, the optimal choice is to
reduce consumption of the traded good, even if the two goods are comple-
ments.
Besides distorting decisions regarding Oh and CT , a change in P s also
aﬀects the demand for inputs by the ﬁrm. To see this, substitute the solutions
for Oh and CT into the current account equation. This produces
LˆT =
µ [−τγoh(1− θot) + σc(θctγoh − γctθoh)]
(1− τ)(1− θot) Pˆ
s. (19)
By substituting out the γ and θ terms one can show that the coeﬃcient
on this term is always negative so lowering P s always brings about greater
hours worked. As OˆT = LˆT , we get the automatic result that a decrease in
P s also drives up the demand for oil by the ﬁrm, even though the ﬁrm does
not directly beneﬁt from the subsidy. Given the fact that both OT and LT
increase we also know that QˆT will be positive.
Increased output in the economy could be seen as a positive result of the
subsidy by some. But, the reason the economy produces more is because
the subsidy has led to over-consumption of fuel products. These products
must be traded for and, therefore, lead to the higher levels of output seen.
The only case where this would not occur would be if labor was inelastically
supplied. But, in that special case we would get the result that CT would be
completely crowded out to pay for the extra consumption of Oh. This result
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highlights the fact that the subsidy is not a free lunch at the aggregate level.
The beneﬁts households derive from the extra consumption of fuel products
comes at the expense of working more and, possibly, consuming less of other
goods.
2.6.2 Subsidy Beneﬁts Only Firms
It is possible to use the exact same procedure to solve for the steady state
changes when the subsidy only beneﬁts ﬁrms. The change in wages in this
case is given by
Wˆ T = −α
T
o
αTl
Pˆ s, (20)
where
αTo =
P¯ sO¯T
W¯ T L¯T + P¯ sO¯T
,
αTl =
W¯ T L¯T
W¯ T L¯T + P¯ sO¯T
,
are the cost shares of oil and labor in the traded sector, respectively. Lowering
P s unambiguously drives up wages in the economy as it increases demand
for oil products which, due to the complementarity between oil and labor,
drives up the marginal product of labor.
In this case the marginal product of oil is now less than the true cost of
said oil as P s < P o. This leads to a slight change in the equation one derives
from the current account equation,
LˆT =
θct
1− θot Cˆ
T +
θoh
1− θot Oˆ
h +
σT
(
αTo − θot
)
αTl (1− θot)
Pˆ s.
A Pˆ s term directly appears this time and since αTl < θot, it has a negative
sign. This reﬂects the gap between the cost of the oil to society and the
extra production that the oil generates, a gap that must eventually be paid
for somehow.
As before, the ﬁrst order conditions for CT and Oh provide the solutions
for those two variables,
Oˆh =
1
1
τ
+ 1
µ
−σT
(
αTo − θot
)
µαTl (1− θot)
Pˆ s + Wˆ T
 , (21)
CˆT = Oˆh. (22)
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When the subsidy only beneﬁts ﬁrms, the consumption variables are pulled in
opposite directions by two diﬀerent forces. The Wˆ T term represents the fact
that lowering P s drives wages up, which pushes for increased consumption of
both goods. On the other hand, the Pˆ s term, which has a positive coeﬃcient
on it, captures the increased taxation required to ﬁnance the subsidy and
the gap that appears in the current account equation. These forces push for
decreased consumption.
Unfortunately, after substituting out the Wˆ T term, it is not possible to
sign the combined coeﬃcient on the term. It is possible, however, to show
that the coeﬃcient will be negative iﬀ
µ >
σT
(
θot − αTo
)
(1− θot)αTo
.
In other words, when labor is suﬃciently elastic the agent consume more of
both goods. Intuitively, this is similar to what happens when only households
beneﬁt from the subsidy. Inelastic labor supply leads to suﬃciently small
responses in LT which then makes it optimal for the household to pay for
the tax by reducing consumption of both goods.
While the results for CT and Oh require some assumptions about how
elastically labor is supplied, it is possible to derive unambiguous results for
the labor supply itself. The solution for that variable is
LˆT =
µσT
(
αTo − θot
)
αTl (τ + µ)(1− θt)
Pˆ s +
1
1
τ
+ 1
µ
Wˆ T . (23)
After substituting out Wˆ T , the coeﬃcient on this solution is always negative
so that once again, lowering P s leads to more labor being supplied. The ﬁrst
order conditions for the ﬁrm can also be manipulated to give
OˆT = LˆT − σt
αTl
Pˆ s,
which leads to the immediate result that OˆT is positive and, therefore, that
QT increases in the long-run when P s is lowered.
2.6.3 Subsidy Beneﬁts Households and Firms
The results just derived apply to cases where the subsidy beneﬁts either
households or ﬁrms. This helps highlight the eﬀects at play that determine
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how a speciﬁc variable adjusts when P s is changed. The empirical evidence
suggests that usually both households and ﬁrms beneﬁt from the subsidy. In
that case the long run impacts are a combination of the eﬀects that occur in
the two special cases just discussed.
Table one summarizes what we know so far by showing how CT , Oh, LT ,
OT , QT , and W T vary when P s is changed. The box contains a - sign if the
variable decreases, a + if it increases, and a ? if the change is ambiguous.
The three cases where the subsidy falls on the household, the ﬁrm, or both
households and ﬁrms are considered.
Deﬁnite answers can be given for the variables related to production. In
all three cases, lowering P s leads to a long-run increase in labor supplied,
oil demanded by ﬁrms, and output in the traded sector. Wages remain
unchanged or rise, with the most realistic case calling for a rise in wages.
For the consumption variables, the changes depend upon the calibration
of the model. More speciﬁcally, the directions for Oh and CT depend upon
the elasticity of the labor supply and whether or not the two goods are
Edgeworth complements. The analytical results suggest that crowding out
of the non-oil consumption good may occur when the goods are substitutes
consumption or if µ is small enough.
2.6.4 Monetary and Fiscal Variables
As of now, nothing has been said of the variables m, F , i, T or χ. With the
solutions for the real variables in hand, though, the second block of equations
can be used to solve for these. In the case where lump sum taxes are used
to ﬁnance the spending, we know that T must rise to pay for the increased
spending on the subsidy. Given that χ is ﬁxed, we know that the nominal
interest rate does not change across steady states. In the polar case where the
inﬂation tax is used to ﬁnance spending, we know that T is ﬁxed, and that χ
and i rise across steady states. Unfortunately, easily signed solutions for m
and F were impossible to derive. Therefore a discussion of how the subsidy
impacts money demand is delayed until the next section when numerical
results are presented.
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3 An Economy with Non-traded Goods
The primitive model is useful as a starting point because the analytical results
derived from it are relatively clean cut. This helps provide useful intuition
about the various ways in which the subsidy aﬀects certain macroeconomic
variables. An important caveat, though, is that most developing countries
are not nearly as open as the model assumes in that a signiﬁcant portion
of economic activity is in non-traded goods. This section introduces non-
traded goods into the primitive model and then re-considers the long-run
eﬀects of the subsidy. As I will show shortly, this is an important extension
as fuel subsidies distort relative prices and the extent to which the economy
produces traded or non-traded goods.
3.1 The Model
Technically, adding a non-traded good is relatively simple. First, the utility
from consumption is changed to
(
CT
σc−1
σc + a1O
h
σc−1
σc + a2C
n
σc−1
σc
)( σcσc−1)(1− 1τ )
1− 1
τ
,
where Cn is consumption of the non-traded good. The equation for PCPI
now reads
PCPI =
(
1 + aσc1 P
s1−σc + aσc2 P
n1−σc
) 1
1−σc ,
where P n is the relative price of the non-traded good to the traded good.
Aggregate labor is now deﬁned as L = Ln + LT and the disutility from
working is now modeled as
−κ1 (L
n + LT )1+
1
µ
1 + 1
µ
.
The traded good remains the numeraire so the wealth constraint is the same
but the ﬂow constraint for the agent now reads
A˙ = W nLn +W TLT + (i− χ)b− CT − P nCn − P sOh − T − χm,
where W n is the real wage paid in the non-traded sector, denominated in
terms of the traded good.
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The ﬁrst order conditions for labor supply in the traded and non-traded
sector merit some discussion. These equations are given by
κ3L
1
µ = λ1W
n,
κ3L
1
µ = λ1W
T .
As labor is fully mobile between the traded and non-traded sector, wages
across sectors must be equal. This can be seen by combining the two equa-
tions together. I, therefore, simplify the exposition by deﬁning the equilib-
rium real wage as W . The remaining ﬁrst order condition then reads
κ3L
1
µ = λ1W.
I assume that the non-traded good is produced by a representative ﬁrm
operating under perfect competition using oil and labor as inputs. Technol-
ogy in this sector is
Qn =
[
(AnLn)
σn−1
σn + d1 (O
n)
σn−1
σn
] σn
σn−1
,
where An is a scaling factor, d1 is a distribution parameter, O
n is oil de-
manded by the ﬁrm, and σn is the elasticity of substitution between labor
and oil demanded. The proﬁt maximization problem for the ﬁrm, denomi-
nated in dollars, is
max
Ln,On
Qn − W
n
P n
Ln − P
s
P n
On.
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are
Qn
1
σn (AnLn)−
1
σn An =
W n
P n
, (24)
Qn
1
σn d1 (O
n)−
1
σn =
P s
P n
. (25)
These equate the marginal products of each input with its respective marginal
cost, denominated in dollars. The relative price term appears in the ﬁrst
order conditions due to the choice of the numeraire. The market clearing
condition for the non-traded sector is given by
Cn = Qn, (26)
and holds at all times.
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Since the ﬁrm in the non-traded sector also uses oil products, the gov-
ernment budget constraint and the current account equation are slightly
modiﬁed. They are, respectively,
m˙ = (P o − P s)
(
Oh +OT +On
)
− T − χm. (27)
F˙ = QT − CT − P oOh − P oOT − P oOn. (28)
3.2 Analytical Results
The procedure used earlier to derive results about how the subsidy distorts
the steady state can be used with this model as well. While most of the
analytical results end up being too complicated to easily interpret, there are
some important exceptions. Results for the change in wages and the relative
price of the non-traded good are particularly easy to derive. It is also possible,
in the case where the subsidy only beneﬁts households, to derive solutions
for CT and Oh.
3.2.1 Subsidy Beneﬁts Only Firms
The four ﬁrst-order conditions for the ﬁrms can be used by themselves to
solve for the changes in W and P n across steady states. In the case that
ﬁrms beneﬁt from the subsidy but households do not, the results state that
Wˆ = −α
T
o
αTl
Pˆ s, (29)
Pˆ n =
αno − αTo
αTl
Pˆ s, (30)
where αno is the cost share of oil in the non-traded sector. The solution for
Wˆ is exactly the same as before and shows that lowering P s unambiguously
increases wages in the economy.
The result for P n depends upon whether the cost share of oil is higher in
the non-traded sector or the traded sector. If it is higher in the traded sector
then P n falls and vice-versa. The key to understanding why this holds is to
realize that the change in P s may have asymmetric eﬀects on costs in the two
sectors. Wages are guaranteed to rise when P s falls, but the exact amount
by whichW rises is determined by how oil intensive the traded sector is. The
rise in wages drives up costs in the non-traded sector but this is, potentially,
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oﬀset by lower costs for fuel products. If the non-traded sector is relatively
more oil-intensive than the traded sector, the decline in the domestic price
of oil is suﬃcient to bring about lower costs for the non-traded ﬁrm. This
reﬂects itself in a lower relative price in the long-run. In the opposite case
the reduction in the price of oil is not enough to override the rise in wages
and costs rise in the non-traded sector, which drives up P n.
Regardless of whether P n rises or falls, the fact that it does change means
the subsidy has an additional unintended consequence on the economy. The
change in P n creates an additional substitution eﬀect that will distort house-
hold decisions about the relative mix of traded to non-traded consumption
goods. If P n rises, for example, this pushes for households to substitute away
from non-traded goods. Given the market clearing condition for non-traded
goods, this indirectly has implications for the amount of labor supplied to
the non-traded sector, as well.
3.2.2 Subsidy Beneﬁts Only Households
When the subsidy only falls on households the results are simple,
Wˆ = 0, (31)
Pˆ n = 0. (32)
With the world price of oil constant wages, and therefore costs in both sectors,
remain unchanged across steady states. As costs do not change for either
sector the relative price of the non-traded good is also ﬁxed in this case.
As P n is constant it is possible to solve for the changes in the three
consumption variables,
Oˆh = − σc1
τ
+ 1
µ
[
τγoh + σc(1− γoh)
σcτ
+
η(θct + θcn)
(1− θot)µ +
1− η
µ
]
Pˆ s, (33)
CˆT = − σc1
τ
+ 1
µ
[
(τ − σc)γoh
τσc
− ηθoh
µ(1− θot)
]
Pˆ s, (34)
Cˆn = CˆT , (35)
where η = L¯
T
L¯
is the share of labor used in the traded sector out of total
labor supplied. When η = 1 the solutions collapse to those in the previous
section, as θcn = 0.
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Despite the addition of a few extra terms, the qualitative results are ex-
actly the same as in the case with only traded goods. Lowering P s always
increases consumption of fuel products but may or may not lead to crowding
out of the other consumption goods available to the household. More specif-
ically, as before if τ ≤ σc the three goods are Edgeworth substitutes and the
consumer reduces consumption of Cn and CT . If τ > σc then consumption
rises iﬀ
µ >
ηθohτσc
(1− θot)(τ − σc)γoh ,
with the result again being driven by income eﬀects associated with increased
taxation.
3.2.3 Subsidy Beneﬁts both Firms and Households
Unfortunately, the analytical results are fairly sparse for the model with
non-traded goods. In a realistic case where households and ﬁrms beneﬁt
from the subsidy we can rest assured that lowering P s causes wages to rise
in the economy. Given cost-shares for oil in the two sectors we can also make
accurate predictions about what happens to the relative price of the non-
traded good. Beyond this it is impossible to know for sure which direction
the variables will move.
3.3 Numerical Results
Given the lack of easily interpretable analytical solutions, I turn to numer-
ical solutions to help ﬁll in the gap. This requires calibrating the model,
specifying a speciﬁc value for Pˆ s, and choosing how ﬁscal policy ﬁnances the
subsidy.
I calibrate the model's initial steady state to match features of a typical
oil-importing developing country that has had experience with fuel subsidies,
such as Cambodia, Bangladesh or Honduras. Real GDP is calibrated to unity
so that GDP ratios can be used to aide in calibrating many of the model's
variables. I consider a baseline calibration and several alternative calibrations
for µ, σc, and the relative usage of oil in the traded and non-traded sectors.
Table two at the end of the paper records the baseline and alternative values
used for the parameters and many of the starting values for the model's
variables.
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Some evidence presented in Coady, El-Said, Gillingham, Kpodar, Medas,
and Newhouse (2006) show that the consumption shares of fuel products for
several developing countries were somewhere in the range of 3 to 6.5 percent.
The numbers for developed countries are typically in that range as well, so
I choose to calibrate the consumption share of fuel products at 5 percent of
GDP.
Unfortunately, little data is available that would allow one to pin down
spending on oil products by the traded and non-traded sectors. Given the
lack of data I use the following strategy. I set total spending on oil prod-
ucts by both sectors equal to 5 percent of GDP. This is an educated guess
made with reference to what this number was for developed countries when
they were more energy intensive. For the baseline calibration, I assume that
spending on oil products is equal to 2.5 percent of GDP in each sector. Un-
der one alternative calibration I set spending in the traded sector equal to 1
percent of GDP while spending in the non-traded sector is equal to 4 percent.
Another alternative sets spending in the traded sector to 4 percent of GDP
and spending in the non-traded sector at 1 percent. These calibrations allow
me to explore the importance of the relative oil intensities of the two sectors.
The analytical results earlier highlighted the importance of µ. A baseline
case sets µ to 1 while an alternative calibration considers a low-elasticity
of 1/8. The parameter σc controls the price-elasticity of demand for fuel
products and, in conjunction with τ , determines the complementarity of the
consumption goods. I set τ equal to .50 and consider settings of .25 and .75
for σc. The former sets the goods as Edgeworth complements and provides a
low price elasticity of demand while the latter sets the goods as Edgeworth
substitutes and gives a price elasticity of demand for fuel products on the
high range of what empirical studies typically ﬁnd.
In specifying a value for Pˆ s, I assume that initially P s = P o and then
ask what happens to the steady state when P s is lowered by 10 percent. For
the calibrations used, this usually results in a subsidy that costs roughly 1
percent of GDP in the new steady state.
Finally, ﬁscal policy must be speciﬁed. I consider two polar cases: one
where χ is held ﬁxed and T adjusts to clear the budget constraint and one
where T is held ﬁxed while χ is adjusted to clear the budget constraint.
Table 3 shows the results for the case where lump sum taxation adjusts
to clear the government budget constraint and σc is set to .25 so that the
consumption goods are Edgeworth complements. There are seven columns
in this table with each row in the ﬁrst column identifying what variable is
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being discussed. The next three columns set µ to 1 and show the results
for the three calibrations of oil usage. In column 2 we have higher spending
on oil in the traded sector, column 3 equal spending, and column 4 higher
spending in the non-traded sector. Columns 5 - 7 is for the alternative, lower
calibration of µ.
Several results presented in table 3 perfectly mirror the analytical results
presented earlier for the model with non-traded goods. Reading across the
row for W , we see that the change in wages is driven by the relative usage of
oil by the two sectors, with larger changes associated with greater usage by
the traded sector. Likewise, the response of P n is in line with the analytical
result derived earlier, rising when oil is more heavily used by the traded sector
and falling when oil is used more heavily in the non-traded sector.
The changes in CT and Cn are small in magnitude, sometimes positive
and sometimes negative. Substitution eﬀects brought about by changes to P s
and P n, increased income from higher wages, and increased taxation seem to
essentially wash out for the two non-oil consumption goods. As predicted by
the analytical results, reducing the size of µ brings about smaller increases
in total labor supplied and makes it more attractive for the agent to reduce
consumption to pay for increased taxes. This can be seen by comparing the
results for the consumption variables in columns 2 and 5, 3 and 6, and 4 and
7. In each case the change is about .25 percent lower for the low setting of µ.
For certain cases it is possible to see reductions in one or both of the non-oil
consumption goods, although quantitatively the amounts are small.
Rows 4 - 6 show the changes in the total labor supply and the breakdown
in labor supplied to the two sectors. Total labor supply rises in both cases
considered, with the traded sector seeing a proportionally greater increase
than the non-traded sector. When µ is low it is even possible to see labor
ﬂow out of the non-traded sector. The results for QT and Qn mirror the im-
plications for LT and Ln as there is always a larger response in output from
the traded sector. The emphasis on producing traded goods is caused by the
same reason output increased in the model without non-traded goods. Low-
ering P s causes increased use of fuel products in the long-run. The numerical
results show that this is paid for mainly through increased production in the
traded sector.
Table 4 presents the results for the case where T once again adjusts,
but σc is equal to .75 instead of .25. This increases the price elasticity of
demand for fuel products and makes the diﬀerent consumption goods Edge-
worth substitutes, as σc > τ now. The main changes in the results are driven
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by the fact that the 10 percent drop in P s now creates a larger substitution
eﬀect towards Oh away from CT and Cn. This leads to reductions in one
or both of the non-oil consumption goods in all cases considered. Given the
signiﬁcantly larger response in Oh, it also brings about greater inﬂows of
labor to the traded sector versus the non-traded sector and, in fact, leads to
reductions in labor supplied to the non-traded sector in all cases considered.
Tables 5 and 6 repeat the experiments of table 3 and 4, respectively,
but instead of lump sum taxation adjusting to clear the government budget
constraint the inﬂation tax is used to ﬁnance the spending. Since the two
ﬁnancing methods are non-distortionary with respect to the real variables in
the model, the results for variables such as CT and so on are equivalent for
the two ﬁnancing choices. The results for rows 1 - 12 (CT to P n) are exactly
the same in table 3 and 5, and in 4 and 6.
Diﬀerent results hold for the monetary variables m and F , which are
respectively shown in rows 13 and 14. This is true because, as explained in
section 2.4, adjusting χ to clear the government budget constraint distorts
the ﬁrst-order conditions for holdings of m and F . In tables 3 and 4, the
results for m and F are driven entirely by changes in aggregate consumption
spending, CT +P nCn+P sOh, since the nominal interest rate does not change
across steady states. In that case, the results are fairly boring. The results are
more dramatic, though, when χ is used to ﬁnance the new spending. Given
the cost of the subsidy, the steady state inﬂation rate rises dramatically in
the long-run, around 16 percent. This causes signiﬁcant capital ﬂight and a
large increase in the nominal interest rate. Of course, the results are driven
by the fact that this is the worst case scenario where the inﬂation tax is used
to ﬁnance 100 percent of the spending increase. For some combination of
increased lump sum taxation and reliance on the inﬂation tax, the increase
in χ will be less and the corresponding amount of capital ﬂight reduced in
the long-run.
4 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has examined the long-run implications of fuel subsidies in an
oil-importing developing country. The main contribution to the literature
is a set of analytical and numerical results that show how the economy's
steady state is distorted when the domestic price of oil is permanently reduced
below that of the world price of oil. These results show that fuel subsidies
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have important eﬀects on a number of macroeconomic variables above and
beyond just promoting over-consumption of fuel products.
For an economy that produces only traded goods, analytical results showed
that the subsidy drives up wages in the economy, leads to ineﬃciently high
labor supply, and increases production of the traded good to pay for the over-
consumed oil. There is also a distinct possibility that non-oil consumption
could be crowded out depending upon how elastic labor is supplied.
A number of similar results hold for an economy that also produces non-
traded goods. As before, the subsidy drives up wages and leads to an over
supply of labor. In addition, it distorts the allocations between the traded
and non-traded sectors, generally leading to an over-emphasis on producing
traded goods to pay for the increased consumption of fuel products. This
occurs regardless of whether or not the relative price of the non-traded good
rises or falls in the economy. When the inﬂation tax is used to ﬁnance the
subsidy, there are also signiﬁcant impacts on monetary variables as well.
All of these results highlight impacts of these subsidies that are usually ig-
nored when considering the pros and cons of fuel subsidies in these countries.
While households certainly beneﬁt from extra consumption of fuel products,
this comes at the indirect cost of working more, potentially reduced con-
sumption of other goods, and ineﬃcient allocation of resources towards the
traded sector.
This paper has focused on long-run implications that fuel subsidies have
for macroeconomic aggregates. There appear to be several promising avenues
for future research that go beyond this focus. First, one could use the model
in this paper to explore the welfare implications of permanently removing a
subsidy already in place or the opposite policy of imposing the subsidy where
there was none before. This would require tracking the transition paths of the
model's variables from the initial steady state to the new steady state brought
about by the policy change and deriving an accurate measure of the welfare
gains/losses brought about by the policy. Second, a shortcoming of this
model is that it is essentially silent on distributional issues. An interesting
extension would be to design a model where agents are heterogenous in their
income. This would lead to diﬀerences in spending on fuel products and,
consequently, diﬀerences in who beneﬁts from the subsidies. These are left
for future research.
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Table 1: Qualitative Changes in Select Macroeconomic Variables
Variable Household Firm Both
P s − − −
CT ? ? ?
Oh + ? ?
LT + + +
OT + + +
QT + + +
W T 0 + +
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters and Steady State Values
Parameter Description Baseline Value Alternative Value
τ Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution .50 −
σc Elasiticity of Substitution (Consumption) .25 .75
σm Elasiticity of Substitution (Money) .75 −
ρ Rate of Time Preference .04 −
χ Inﬂation Rate .06 −
σT Elasticity of Substitution (Traded Sector) .50 −
σn Elasticity of Substitution (Non-traded Sector) .50 −
µ Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply 1 1
8
m Ratio of Real Money Balances to GDP .15 −
F Ratio of Stock of Foreign Currency to GDP .15 −
P sOh Oil to GDP Ratio (Households) .05 −
P sOT Oil to GDP ratio (Traded Sector) .025 .01, .04
P oOn Oil to GDP Ratio (Non-traded Sector) .025 .04, .01
23
Table 3: Percent Change Across Steady States when T Adjusts, σc = .25
µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04 O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04
CT 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.03 −0.04 −0.12
Cn 0.13 0.21 0.29 −0.11 −0.03 0.04
Oh 2.95 2.87 2.80 2.70 2.63 2.55
L 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.10
LT 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.36 0.35 0.33
Ln 0.08 0.08 0.08 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16
W 0.80 0.48 0.19 0.80 0.48 0.19
OT 3.49 3.40 3.31 3.24 3.15 3.06
On 2.95 2.87 2.80 2.70 2.63 2.55
QT 0.80 0.71 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.38
Qn 0.13 0.21 0.29 −0.11 −0.03 0.04
P n 0.58 −0.05 −0.64 0.58 −0.05 −0.64
m 0.11 −0.20 −0.49 −0.13 −0.44 −0.73
F 0.11 −0.20 −0.49 −0.13 −0.44 −0.73
PCPI −0.22 −0.53 −0.82 −0.22 −0.53 −0.82
χ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4: Percent Change Across Steady States when T Adjusts, σc = .75
µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04 O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04
CT 0.16 −0.08 −0.30 −0.09 −0.33 −0.55
Cn −0.27 −0.04 0.18 −0.52 −0.29 −0.07
Oh 8.39 8.14 7.90 8.12 7.87 7.63
L 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.11 0.11 0.11
LT 1.02 0.84 0.69 0.77 0.59 0.43
Ln −0.33 −0.17 −0.02 −0.58 −0.42 −0.27
W 0.80 0.48 0.19 0.80 0.48 0.19
OT 3.93 3.66 3.42 3.66 3.40 3.16
On 2.54 2.62 2.69 2.28 2.36 2.43
QT 1.22 0.96 0.73 0.97 0.71 0.48
Qn −0.27 −0.04 0.18 −0.52 −0.29 −0.07
P n 0.58 −0.05 −0.64 0.58 −0.05 −0.64
m 0.10 −0.21 −0.50 −0.15 −0.46 −0.76
F 0.10 −0.21 −0.50 −0.15 −0.46 −0.76
PCPI −0.23 −0.54 −0.84 −0.23 −0.54 −0.84
χ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 5: Percent Change Across Steady States when χ Adjusts, σc = .25
µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04 O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04
CT 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.03 −0.04 −0.12
Cn 0.13 0.21 0.29 −0.11 −0.03 0.04
Oh 2.95 2.87 2.80 2.70 2.63 2.55
L 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.10
LT 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.36 0.35 0.33
Ln 0.08 0.08 0.08 −0.16 −0.16 −0.16
W 0.80 0.48 0.19 0.80 0.48 0.19
OT 3.49 3.40 3.31 3.24 3.15 3.06
On 2.95 2.87 2.80 2.70 2.63 2.55
QT 0.80 0.71 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.38
Qn 0.13 0.21 0.29 −0.11 −0.03 0.04
P n 0.58 −0.05 −0.64 0.58 −0.05 −0.64
m −41.88 −42.18 −42.46 −42.08 −42.38 −42.66
F 19.55 19.26 18.98 19.30 19.01 18.74
PCPI −0.22 −0.53 −0.82 −0.22 −0.53 −0.82
χ 16 16 16 16 16 16
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Table 6: Percent Change Across Steady States when χ Adjusts, σc = .75
µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1 µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
µ = 1
8
O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04 O¯n = .01 O¯n = .025 O¯n = .04
CT 0.16 −0.08 −0.30 −0.09 −0.33 −0.55
Cn −0.27 −0.04 0.18 −0.52 −0.29 −0.07
Oh 8.39 8.14 7.90 8.12 7.87 7.63
L 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.11 0.11 0.11
LT 1.02 0.84 0.69 0.77 0.59 0.43
Ln −0.33 −0.17 −0.02 −0.58 −0.42 −0.27
W 0.80 0.48 0.19 0.80 0.48 0.19
OT 3.93 3.66 3.42 3.66 3.40 3.16
On 2.54 2.62 2.69 2.28 2.36 2.43
QT 1.22 0.96 0.73 0.97 0.71 0.48
Qn −0.27 −0.04 0.18 −0.52 −0.29 −0.07
P n 0.58 −0.05 −0.64 0.58 −0.05 −0.64
m −42.66 −42.90 −43.15 −42.86 −43.10 −43.35
F 20.07 19.74 19.45 19.81 19.49 19.19
PCPI −0.23 −0.54 −0.84 −0.23 −0.54 −0.84
χ 17 17 17 17 17 17
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